PUTIN, TRUMP AND XI: FROM UKRAINE TO TAIWAN, AND THE SHADOWS BEHIND THE GLOBAL POWER GAME ( Part 2 )

 

In Part One, “Me” discussed the possibility of Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping sitting at the same table.

Now, let's look beyond the table…

3 leaders, three powerful countries, and a world that cannot afford another round of geopolitical musical chairs. Sounds simple enough, doesn't it?

 

 

THE UKRAINE QUESTION: WHO GETS TO SIT AT THE TABLE?

The first question is obvious. If the proposed meeting is about ending the war in Ukraine, where is Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky?

According to Reuters' October 19 report, the proposed discussions could favour Moscow's interests. The possibility of negotiating Ukraine's future without its own president being present has therefore become a major concern.

Ukraine has objected to the idea of a settlement being discussed over its head.

Think about it. If three powerful men discuss the future of a country that is not represented in the room, can the result automatically be called a fair peace?

A ceasefire can be negotiated by outsiders, but a lasting settlement requires the people who must live with its consequences to have a meaningful voice. Otherwise, we risk confusing a deal between powerful capitals with a solution for the people on the ground.

The difficulty is that Russia and Ukraine do not share the same conditions for peace. Moscow has pursued territorial and political objectives, while Kyiv has insisted on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Washington may want an agreement that ends the fighting, while Beijing has its own diplomatic and strategic interests to consider.

These interests can overlap, but they are not identical.

And here lies the catch. A photograph of Putin, Trump and Xi shaking hands would tell us that a meeting took place. It would not tell us whether Ukraine had obtained a fair settlement, whether the fighting would actually stop, or whether the agreement could survive its first serious test.

 

FROM MOSCOW TO TAIWAN: THE CONNECTION IS POWER

Some readers may ask what Ukraine has to do with Taiwan. After all, one conflict is taking place in Europe, while the other concerns tensions across the Taiwan Strait in East Asia.

The connection is not that Ukraine and Taiwan are the same situation. They are not. The connection is the question of how major powers understand sovereignty, security and their own strategic interests.

Russia's war against Ukraine has raised fundamental questions about the use of force to change internationally recognised borders. Taiwan, meanwhile, faces a different and longstanding dispute involving Beijing's claim over the island, its own self-government, and the security interests of the United States and regional partners.

For China, the Taiwan question is closely tied to national sovereignty and reunification. For Taiwan's government, preserving its self-government and security is central. For Washington, the issue also affects regional stability, strategic credibility and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

Now imagine the broader diplomatic picture…

If Washington and Moscow discuss a Ukraine settlement while Beijing is present, the conversation could extend beyond the battlefield. It could affect how each power calculates the other's willingness to negotiate, apply pressure or make concessions in other disputes.

But let us be careful here. There is no established evidence that a proposed Putin–Trump–Xi meeting would involve a secret agreement over Taiwan. Any claim that Ukraine would be traded for Taiwan would require evidence, not just a vivid imagination and a late-night cup of coffee.

Still, the wider lesson is worth considering. When major powers negotiate, smaller countries and disputed territories can become part of the strategic calculations, even when they are not formally on the agenda.

The question for Asia is therefore not whether Taiwan will automatically become part of a Ukraine deal. It is whether the principles used to negotiate one conflict will influence expectations in another.

If sovereignty is defended in one place but treated as negotiable in another, international confidence in the rules governing relations between states will suffer. That is a dangerous precedent, regardless of which major power benefits.

THE ENEMY WITHIN: WHAT IS HAPPENING INSIDE RUSSIA?

Now let us turn to Moscow's internal shadows.

A BBC investigation published on October 19, 2026, titled “Inside the shadowy world of anti-Putin sabotage from within Russia”, examines accounts from two Russian men who say they have supported Ukrainian intelligence operations. Their claimed activities include targeting military assets and personnel inside Russia.

One man, identified by the BBC under the name Ivan, says he helped facilitate Ukrainian drone attacks against strategic bombers and munitions factories. Another man, known as Foma, describes operating an undercover volunteer network from exile in Poland.

These are serious claims, and they should be treated as accounts reported by the BBC rather than as independently proven details in every respect.

Nevertheless, the report raises an important question: what happens when a country fighting a war abroad also faces covert opposition within its own borders?

The answer is not necessarily that the Russian state is about to collapse. That would be jumping to conclusions. But it does show that the conflict is not confined to the front line in Ukraine. Military infrastructure, intelligence networks and internal security have become part of the wider battlefield.

There is a difference between an organised political opposition, public dissatisfaction with a war, and covert sabotage linked to a foreign intelligence service. They should not be lumped together as though they were the same thing.

Even so, all three are relevant to understanding the pressures confronting a government at war.

For Putin, the problem is not merely how many troops can be deployed or how much equipment can be produced. It is also whether the state can protect strategic assets, maintain public confidence and prevent the war from creating vulnerabilities at home.

A government can present an image of strength on television while confronting difficult problems behind closed doors. That is not unique to Russia; it is a familiar feature of politics across the world.

And this is where the proposed summit becomes interesting. A leader negotiating from a position of strength may seek to preserve existing gains. A leader facing growing military, economic or domestic pressures may also have reasons to explore a diplomatic exit.

However, we should not assume that the BBC's reporting proves Putin is arranging a summit because he fears an internal uprising. There is insufficient evidence to establish that connection.

What we can say is that Russia's internal security challenges form part of the environment in which its leadership makes decisions about the war.

THE MIDDLE EAST: ANOTHER PIECE OF THE PUZZLE

What about the Middle East? Is it connected to this diplomatic triangle?

Yes, there are meaningful strategic connections, although they do not establish that the proposed summit will formally negotiate Middle Eastern conflicts.

Russia has cultivated relationships with Iran and other regional actors, while the United States maintains its own security partnerships and diplomatic interests across the region. China, meanwhile, has economic interests, energy considerations and diplomatic ambitions that extend well beyond East Asia.

These relationships create overlapping calculations.

Consider Iran. Russia and Iran have developed closer strategic cooperation in recent years, including through a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in January 2025. Yet cooperation does not mean that Moscow will automatically support every Iranian action, regardless of the consequences for Russia's relationship with Washington or other regional countries.

A March 2026 BBC News Russian analysis highlighted this tension: Moscow faced competing considerations in its relationship with Tehran, including the risk of antagonising Trump while managing the wider consequences of conflict in the Middle East.

This is geopolitics in its less glamorous form. Countries can cooperate on one issue while disagreeing on another. They can be partners without being unconditional allies. And they can support each other when interests align, only to become more cautious when the cost of cooperation rises.

Now consider the relationship between the Ukraine war and energy markets. Russia is a major energy producer, and disruptions in the Middle East can affect oil prices, shipping routes and global economic confidence. Changes in energy prices can influence Russia's revenues, the cost of fuel for other economies and the political calculations of governments trying to manage inflation.

Reuters reported on October 19 that the proposed summit discussions emerged amid developments in US–Russia relations, including a reported Russian diesel purchase arrangement and a US decision to waive certain sanctions. These developments provide context for the diplomacy, but they do not prove that an agreement on the Middle East has been reached.

The wider point is that the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East do not exist in separate economic universes. Energy markets connect them, military resources compete for attention, and diplomatic decisions in one region can affect calculations in another.

For Middle Eastern nations, a potential meeting between Washington, Moscow and Beijing could therefore matter even if their leaders are not invited. They would still need to assess its possible effects on energy security, regional partnerships, sanctions and the balance of influence.

But again, let us not manufacture a grand conspiracy where the available evidence shows only intersecting interests. The Middle East is not a single political bloc, and its governments do not all share the same objectives.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Israel, Türkiye and other regional players have different priorities, relationships and security concerns. Their responses to any great-power arrangement would depend on what it actually contained.

In short, the Middle East is part of the wider geopolitical picture, but that does not mean every regional conflict is being secretly negotiated by three presidents.

WHERE DO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS FIT IN?

This brings us to another important question. If the leaders of the United States, Russia and China can discuss a possible settlement, what happens to international organisations?

First, we need to distinguish a diplomatic meeting from a formal international agreement.

The United Nations is not a world government that can simply order every country to obey its preferred outcome. Its effectiveness depends on its Charter, member states, diplomatic processes and, in important cases, the decisions of its Security Council.

Russia and China are permanent members of that Council, as is the United States. This gives all three countries significant institutional influence, including the ability to veto substantive Security Council resolutions.

That arrangement matters because the same major powers involved in global diplomacy also possess considerable power over the institutions intended to maintain international peace and security.

However, the UN is not irrelevant merely because powerful leaders choose to meet privately.

The General Assembly, international humanitarian law and the wider framework of the UN Charter remain important to the debate over Ukraine. In September 2026, the United Nations reiterated the importance of Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and a just and lasting peace consistent with the Charter.

The same principles raise questions beyond Europe. If the international community treats sovereignty as a rule that applies only when convenient, the credibility of that rule weakens everywhere.

Other institutions may also have a role, depending on the final arrangements. The International Atomic Energy Agency could be relevant to nuclear safety or safeguards where its mandate applies. The International Criminal Court has a distinct legal mandate concerning crimes within its jurisdiction. The European Union and NATO have their own roles in European security, while APEC provides an economic cooperation framework for the Asia-Pacific region.

But none of these organisations automatically becomes a party to a private three-leader discussion simply because the meeting takes place during an international summit.

APEC, in particular, is primarily an economic cooperation forum. A proposed political meeting on its sidelines would not transform APEC into a peace-enforcement body.

That distinction is important. The venue may provide an opportunity for diplomacy, but the venue itself does not guarantee legitimacy, enforcement or lasting peace.

A HANDSHAKE IS NOT A PEACE TREATY

A war that has continued for years carries enormous human and economic costs. If discussions between major powers can help stop the killing, reduce escalation and create a workable path towards peace, they deserve serious consideration.

But the details matter more than the photograph.

Will Ukraine have a meaningful role in determining its own future? What security arrangements would prevent another invasion? How would territorial disputes be handled? What would happen to sanctions? Would any agreement have clear mechanisms for monitoring compliance? And what happens if one side decides to ignore the terms?

These are not small-print questions. They are the questions that separate a political announcement from an agreement capable of surviving contact with reality.

The same applies to Taiwan and the Middle East. A discussion between powerful leaders may affect the strategic environment, but no one should assume that other countries' interests can be settled fairly without their participation.

There is also a danger in treating international politics as a private club for the powerful. The United States, Russia and China have enormous influence, but they do not own the world. Other states have sovereignty, interests and rights that cannot simply be erased because a larger country finds them inconvenient.

At the same time, smaller countries should understand that great-power diplomacy can affect their security even when they are absent from the room. That is why international institutions, regional cooperation and clear legal principles remain important.

The proposed meeting could create an opportunity for progress. It could also produce little more than statements, carefully staged photographs and competing interpretations of what was agreed. At this stage, the outcome remains uncertain.

As the saying goes, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating." In diplomacy, the proof is in what the parties actually implement.

Three men may sit at one table, but the consequences of their decisions will travel far beyond it. From the battlefields of Ukraine to the Taiwan Strait, from Moscow's internal security challenges to the energy markets of the Middle East, the real question is whether diplomacy can produce arrangements that reduce conflict rather than merely rearrange the balance of power.

Because when the cameras are switched off and the motorcades have driven away, ordinary people will still have to live with the consequences.

And that, ladies and gentlemen, is where the real story begins.

P/S: watching the headlines, questioning the fine print, and reminding everyone that geopolitics is not a game of chess when real human lives are the pieces.